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Michael S. Knoll is the Theodore Warner
Professor at the University of Pennsylvania
Law School, professor of real estate at the
Wharton School, and co-director of the Center
for Tax Law and Policy at University of
Pennsylvania. Ruth Mason is Class of 1957
Research Professor of Law at the University of
Virginia School of Law. Mason served as an
expert for taxpayers in cases implicating the
issues discussed in this article. Publishing an
article was not contemplated as part, nor a
condition, of that representation. She has no
pending financial stake in the outcomes of those
cases.
In this report, the authors respond to an
article by professor Edward Zelinsky that
recently appeared in State Tax Notes.

reasoning in Wynne makes clear that New York’s
tax residence rule unconstitutionally violates the
dormant commerce clause. The dormant
commerce clause forbids state tax rules that
discriminate against cross-border commerce,
which, as the Supreme Court has long
acknowledged, occurs when state tax rules
discourage cross-border commerce relative to instate commerce.
Zelinsky objects that Wynne is enigmatic
because “its central conclusion — that tarifflike
state tax polices discriminate for dormant
commerce clause purposes — has no discernable
limit.” But the Supreme Court has confirmed that
we can ferret out income taxes that function as
tariffs via the easy-to-apply internal consistency
test.2 We have explained in other work both the
connection between the internal consistency test
and tariffs and how the internal consistency test
can be applied to identify discriminatory tax
3
policies.
Tax rules violate the internal consistency test
when, if imposed by every state, they would lead
inevitably to double taxation. One of the
advantages of the internal consistency test is that
it allows a court to determine the constitutionality
of a state tax by looking at that state’s tax rules in
isolation. It is not necessary for a court to consider
how New York’s state tax laws interact with New
Jersey’s — or Wyoming’s — state tax laws.

Copyright 2017 by Michael S. Knoll and
Ruth Mason.
All rights reserved.
In the November 13, 2017, issue of State Tax
1
Notes, professor Edward Zelinsky disagreed with
our conclusion that the U.S. Supreme Court’s

1

Edward A. Zelinsky, “Double Taxing Dual Residents: A Response to
Knoll and Mason,” State Tax Notes, Nov. 13, 2017, p. 677.

2

Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015).

3

See Michael S. Knoll and Ruth Mason, “The Economic Foundation of
the Dormant Commerce Clause,” 103 Va. L. Rev. 309 (2017). We have
sympathy for the other points Zelinsky makes — including that there is
no compelling reason to treat subsidies differently from taxes under the
dormant commerce clause. Although the different legal treatments of
discriminatory taxes and discriminatory subsidies may not be satisfying
intellectually, we disagree that it makes the dormant commerce clause
limitless.
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For the reasons we explained earlier, New
York’s residence rules are internally inconsistent.4
If all 50 states adopted New York’s tax residence
rules, dual residents would always be doubletaxed on their income from intangibles.5 As a
result, under the reasoning of Wynne, New York
has a constitutional problem.
Moreover, the Wynne ruling is neither
incoherent nor as broad as Zelinsky suggests.
Zelinsky gives the example of Maryland reducing
its personal income tax rate, which, as he points
out, would encourage Maryland residents to
retain more of their money at home (to take
advantage of the reduced tax rate). According to
Zelinsky, the Maryland rate reduction would
operate as a tariff (because it encourages residents
to invest at home) and would under the logic in
Wynne be unconstitutional — even though to hold
such a tax reduction unconstitutionally
discriminatory would cause the Wynne majority
6
to “recoil.”
Such a bizarre result, however, is neither
implied nor compelled by Wynne, which dictates
the opposite result. An across-the-board rate
reduction would not fail the internal consistency
test. If, for example, Maryland reduced its
personal income tax rate from 5 percent to 4
percent, then, applying the internal consistency
test, all other states also would be assumed to tax
personal income at 4 percent. Assuming
Maryland either (1) taxed only in-state income or
(2) taxed the in-state income of nonresidents and
the worldwide income of residents and offered
residents a full credit (a credit of up to 4 percent)
for taxes paid to other states, then in-state and
cross-border income would both be taxed at 4
percent, and hence the Maryland tax would be
internally consistent.
Such a tax would not be discriminatory
because it would not discourage cross-border
commerce relative to in-state commerce. The

7

4

Knoll and Mason, “New York’s Unconstitutional Tax Residence
Rule,” State Tax Notes, Aug. 14, 2017, p. 707.
5

New York law allows for tax residence both by domicile and by a
statutory residence test that looks to physical presence and maintenance
of an abode in New York. For both types of residents, New York taxes all
their intangibles income without any double tax relief. If all states
applied New York’s rules, dual residents would be taxed on their
intangibles income by both of their tax residence states without any
credits or apportionment to relieve the overlap. Id.
6

hypothetical Maryland tax change would
encourage both residents and nonresidents to earn
income in Maryland. In contrast, a discriminatory
Maryland tax would simultaneously both
encourage Maryland residents to earn income in
Maryland and discourage Maryland nonresidents
from earning income in Maryland. It is the
simultaneous occurrence of those two opposing
effects on residents and nonresidents that is the
tarifflike impact that the internal consistency test
ferrets out, and that is at the heart of a
discrimination claim. Those opposing effects
7
occurred in Wynne; they occurred in Tamagni; but
8
they do not occur in Zelinsky’s hypothetical.
As for Zelinsky’s claim that Supreme Court
precedent would make it difficult for the Court to
strike down New York’s residence rule, neither
Worcester Country Trust nor Cory v. White, the cases
Zelinsky cited as “standing in the way” of
applying Wynne to New York’s tax residence rule,
9
involved the dormant commerce clause. Both
involved executors’ unsuccessful attempts to
invoke the Federal Interpleader Act to dispose of
two states’ potentially conflicting claims of
domicile over the same decedent.
In both cases, the Supreme Court held that the
11th Amendment barred the Court from
preventing the state courts from coming to their
own determinations as to the domicile status of
the decedents, even though those determinations
might conflict with each other. According to
Worcester County, the executor’s argument
demanding interpleader “confuse[d] the
possibility of conflict of decisions of the courts of
the two states, which the Constitution does not
forestall, with other types of action by state
officers which, because it passes beyond the limits
of a lawful authority, is within the reach of the
federal judicial power, notwithstanding the
Eleventh Amendment.”10 The Worcester County
Court observed that neither due process nor full

Zelinsky, supra note 1, at 683-684.

270

Tamagni v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of New York, 673 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1998),
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 931 (1998) (holding that New York’s residence rule
did not violate the dormant commerce clause).
8

For the same reason, Zelinsky’s other example of putative
discrimination — direct expenditures (including those for job training or
improved roads) — also do not necessarily involve discrimination in the
dormant commerce clause sense.
9

Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292, 298 (1937); and Cory
v. White, 457 U.S. 85 (1982).
10

Worcester County Trust, 302 U.S. at 292, 298.

STATE TAX NOTES, JANUARY 15, 2018
For more State Tax Notes content, please visit www.taxnotes.com.

© 2018 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

SPECIAL REPORT

faith and credit require state courts to come to
uniform decisions regarding domicile. The
Worcester County Court specifically noted that
“the present suit is not founded on the asserted
unconstitutionality of any state statute and the
consequent want of lawful authority for official
11
action taken under it.”
Similarly, although the Supreme Court in Cory
v. White noted that “inconsistent determinations
by the courts of two States as to the domicile of a
taxpayer did not raise a substantial federal
constitutional question,” this analysis went to the
appropriateness of federal judicial intervention to
prevent conflicting state determinations
12
regarding domicile. Neither case involved a
dormant commerce clause challenge of a state’s
tax residence rules.
Because the 11th Amendment would have
barred the state courts from taking
unconstitutional actions, however, Worcester
County is cited for the more general proposition
that there is no constitutional bar to double
domicile. As Zelinsky acknowledges, that view
has been subject to criticism from members of the
Court.13
More importantly, it is not the holding of
Wynne, or our contention, that dual domicile is

11

Worcester County Trust, 302 at 300.

12

Cory v. White, 457 U.S. at 89. The three dissenting justices in Cory
worried that the majority was raising the bar for federal adjudication too
high. Id. at 94 (“The Court must rely on a double contingency: first, that
both States might win judgments in their own courts that Hughes was a
domiciliary subject to estate taxation; and second, that in such a case the
Hughes estate might not be large enough to satisfy both claims.”)
(emphasis in original).
13

In his concurrence in Cory v. White, Justice Brennan noted that
“later cases, construing the Due Process Clause, have undermined
Worcester County’s holding that the unfairness of double taxation on the
basis of conflicting determinations of domicile does not rise to
constitutional dimensions.” Cory v. White, 457 U.S. at 92 (Brennan, J.,
concurring). Id. (“And Justice POWELL is surely correct in observing that
‘[t]he threat of multiple taxation based solely on domicile simply is
incompatible with the structural principles of a federal system
recognizing as ‘fundamental’ a constitutional right to travel’”) (quoting
Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 59 S. Ct. 563, 83 L. Ed. 817 (1939)). See also id.
(Powell, Marshall, and Stevens, dissenting) (“Rigidly applying an aged
and indefensible precedent, the Court denies the administrator and heirs
of an estate any federal forum in which to resolve incompatible claims of
domicile.”). Id. (“The premise, accepted by Worcester County, that
multiple taxation on the basis of domicile does not offend the
Constitution — even in a case in which both of the taxing States concede
that a person may have but one domicile . . . [i]n my view . . . is wrong. I
now would be prepared to overrule Worcester County on this point and to
hold that multiple taxation on the basis of domicile — at least insofar as
‘domicile’ is treated as indivisible, so that a person can be the
domiciliary of but one State — is incompatible with the structure of our
federal system.”). See id. at 97 (arguing that “multiple taxation based on
domicile is prohibited by the Due Process Clause”).

necessarily unconstitutional. Thus, in full
agreement with Zelinsky, we would not advocate
for courts to simply pick a winner in the domicile
contest. Thus, when Zelinsky points out that
courts have upheld dual residence cases against
constitutional challenges in the past, our response
is that they may still do so in the future. That is
because, even after Wynne, the dormant
commerce clause does not per se forbid double
taxation, and by implication, it does not per se
forbid dual tax residence.
States’ definitions of tax residence may differ,
resulting in dual residence and even unrelieved
double taxation. The Constitution imposes no
requirement that states use uniform tax residence
rules. To satisfy the Constitution, however, a
state’s tax residence rule must be internally
consistent, such that if every state applied it,
double taxation would not inevitably arise.14
Although Worcester Country Trust is silent on the
matter, under the laws of both states in Cory v.
White, a person could be domiciled in only one
state at a time.15 Because each state had a statutory
scheme that, if adopted by all the states, would
assign a person to only one state at a time, each
state’s domicile rule (whatever it was) was
internally consistent because neither would lead
to double taxation if adopted by all the states.
In contrast, as we showed in our earlier article,
New York’s tax residence regime is internally
inconsistent.16 If every state applied rules identical
to New York’s, double taxation of people with
cross-border economic activities would inevitably
result. Thus, Worcester County Trust and Cory v.
White dealt with issues that are different from the
dormant commerce clause issue we raised
regarding New York’s tax residence rules.
Zelinsky would prefer Congress to step in to
referee dual tax residence disputes among the
states. He’s probably right that federal legislation
would lead to more rational and predictable
results. But, until then, the dormant commerce
clause safeguards our common market from
states that would seek to take more than their

14

Cf. Wynne (approving the internal inconsistency as a test for
dormant commerce clause violations).
15

Cory v. White, 457 U.S. at 86 (“Under the laws of Texas and
California, an individual has but one domicile at any time.”).
16

See discussion, supra note 7.
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share from interstate commerce. In setting the
limits of the dormant commerce clause, the
Supreme Court has struck a careful balance
between promoting interstate commerce and state
tax sovereignty.
Zelinsky argues that if dual domicile cases
must be resolved by the courts rather than
through the legislature, then the right solution is
apportionment. Although we suggested an
internally consistent apportionment rule as one
way for New York to resolve the constitutional
infirmity in its tax residence rule, in our view the
states, not the courts, are entitled to choose such
features of their tax laws, provided they do not
violate the Constitution.
We would note, however, that Zelinsky draws
a false dichotomy between dormant commerce
clause apportionment rules and dormant
17
commerce clause nondiscrimination rules. The
principle embedded in the dormant commerce
clause is that the states must not impose tarifflike
taxes that distort competition between taxpayers
on the basis of their state of residence or
engagement in cross-border economic activity.
That requirement applies to all tax rules,
including apportionment rules.


17

Zelinsky, supra note 1, at 685 (“If the problem [of dual tax residence]
is to be addressed judicially, the dormant commerce clause concept of
apportionment provides a more convincing approach . . . than does the
unsatisfactory notion of dormant commerce clause nondiscrimination.”).
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